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Understanding the Merton Thesis 
By Steven Shapin* 
F
IFTY YEARS ON, the Merton thesis continues to arouse historians'  pas- 
sions. It is difficult to understand why. There has never been a celebrated 
historical theory so cautiously framed, so methodologically eclectic, so hedged 
about with qualifications as to its form, content, and consequences, and so tem- 
perately expressed. Robert Merton and his defenders are accustomed to say that 
his thesis has been "misunderstood." They are being much too kind to certain of 
the critics. One is tempted to put the case more strongly than that. On the evi- 
dence of  some  of  those  historians who have endeavored to refute what  they 
represent  to be  his  thesis,  Merton's  1938  monograph  and  related  texts  can 
scarcely have been read at all. Merton is quite right to complain at the cavalier 
treatment he has received at the hands of his critics in the historical community. 
Modern literary theory rightly suggests that the meaning of  a text is not deter- 
mined by its structure or content, nor indeed by the author's intentions. Never- 
theless,  it  is  both  a useful  convention and a justifiable  moral  sanction in  the 
academic world that interpretations and understandings be at least occasionally 
disciplined by reminding readers of what is written in the relevant text. How did 
Merton himself define and characterize his hypothesis? What bearing did these 
representations have on its subsequent career in the academic world? 
First, what was  the nature of  the thing that  Merton was trying to explain? 
Here, at the very core of his enterprise, historians nervous about the black beast 
of "externalism"  should be reassured. Neither in his 1938 text nor in subsequent 
writings was Merton ever concerned to adduce social factors to explain the form 
or content of scientific knowledge or scientific method. Indeed, it is a plausible 
hypothesis that our present-day language of "internal"  and "external" factors, as 
well as the validation of an overwhelmingly "internalist"  historiography of scien- 
tific ideas, actually originated with Merton and the circle of scholars with whom 
he studied and worked in the 1930s. Thus, for example, Merton was exceedingly 
careful to dissociate  himself  explicitly  from  any  enterprise  (e.g., that  of  the 
Marxist Boris Hessen) that sought to account for scientific method or knowledge 
by  reference to social or economic considerations, or, indeed, by reference to 
nonscientific  cultural  factors  such as religion.'  Merton's  claims were  "not  to 
imply that the discoveries of Newton, Boyle or other scientists can be directly 
attributed to the sanction of science by religion. Specific discoveries and inven- 
tions  belong to the internal history of  science and are largely independent of 
factors other than the purely scientific." And in an essay published even before 
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For Merton's repudiation of "vulgar materialism" see Robert K. Merton, "Science and Economy 
of  Seventeenth Century England,"  in Merton, Social  Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. (New 
York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 607-627,  esp. p. 607 (orig. publ. in Science and Society, 1939, 3:3-27). 
Merton made liberal use of Boris Hessen's empirical findings in his 1938 text while distancing his own 
enterprise from Hessen's materialist perspective:  see, e.g., Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology 
and  Society  in Seventeenth-Century  England  (orig.  publ.  in  Osiris,  1938, 4:360-632)  (New York: 
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the 1938 text Merton conceded that "the Puritan ethos did not directly influence 
the method  of  science and that this was  simply a parallel development in  the 
internal history of science." Furthermore, even smaller-scale changes in the foci 
of  scientific  interest  "are  primarily  determined  by  the  internal  history  of 
science,"  and Merton delivered the study of these "short-time fluctuations"  to 
"the province of the historian of science rather than that of the sociologist or the 
student  of  cult~re."~  Far from  poaching  the traditional  game  of  historians  of 
science,  Merton  was  actually  offering them  further  resources  by  which  they 
might protect scientific knowledge from sociological scrutiny. 
For Merton, the explanandum was emphatically not scientific method or scien- 
tific knowledge: it was the dynamics and social standing of a scientific enterprise 
that was itself conceived of as a black box. There was no reason to open up the 
box that contained scientific procedures and knowledge; there was nothing socio- 
logical to be said about what was  in  the box. On  the one hand, Merton was 
concerned to offer a causal hypothesis about the social and cultural dynamics of 
science as a whole in England during the latter part of the seventeenth century; 
on the other, he attempted to account for shifting patterns of interest in different 
scientific and technological problem-areas or disciplines.  Thus, one part of his 
enterprise was designed to explain "increased attention to science," "the growth 
of interest in science and technology,"  "the increased tempo of scientific activ- 
ity," "the enhanced cultivation of science," the "elevat[ion] of science to a place 
of high regard in the social system of values,"  the fact that science was  "posi- 
tively sanctioned"; while another part aimed to account for relatively large-scale 
changes in the "foci of scientific interests."  "Which forces guided the interests of 
scientists and inventors into particular  channel^?"^ Why, for example, was there 
an increase in attention to aerostatics and hydrostatics in the setting with which 
Merton  was  concerned?  Why  was  so  much  of  seventeenth-century  English 
science (as Merton claimed) geared toward economic and military ends? 
Even those  historians who have most unfairly misrepresented the status of 
Merton's  thesis seem to have a rough-and-ready appreciation of  his explanans, 
the entity Merton used  causally  to account for the upsurge  of  interest  in and 
approval of science and technology: it is, of  course, something to do with reli- 
gion,  specifically with  Puritan  strands of  religion. I shall examine the precise 
nature  of  Merton's  explanans later, but  first Merton may  be exculpated from 
unwarranted charges of  historiographic hubris, especially from accusations that 
he advanced a simplistic, or even a simple, monocausal explanation and that the 
particular explanation  he offered possessed general historical  applicability.  Al- 
most no historian, for instance, seems to have read carefully and digested the 
qualifications  and  supplementations  of  the  Puritanism  thesis  to  be  found  in 
Chapter XI of Merton's  1938 text. Here he warned that "any attempt to formu- 
late a comprehensive sociological theory of  scientific development at this time 
must  be  considered premature."  Merton  then  proceeded  to point  to "further 
orders of factors," some cultural, some social, that might be thought relevant to 
explaining the historical materials with which he was concerned. These included 
Merton, Science,  Technology, p. 75; Merton,  "Puritanism, Pietism and  Science," in  Merton, 
Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 574-606,  on p. 579 (orig. publ. in Sociological Review, 1936, 
28:l-30); and Merton, Science, Technology, pp. 48, 50. 
For these and similar expressions see Merton, Science, Technology, pp. 27-28,  73, 75, 80, 137, 
157, 197; and Merton, "Puritanism, Pietism," p. 574. 596  STEVEN SHAPIN 
interesting speculations about population density, the rates and modes of  social 
interaction characteristic of different societies, and other features of the cultural 
context not included in religious  construct^.^ And in the essay published before 
the 1938 text Merton carefully noted that Puritanism only "constitute[d] one im- 
portant element in the enhanced cultivation of science." In other settings "a host 
of other factors--economic,  political, and above all the self-fertilizing movement 
of  science itself'-worked  "to swell the rising scientific current." Since science 
burgeoned in Catholic sixteenth-century Italy, Merton freely acknowledged that 
"these associated factors" might come to "outweigh the religious comp~nent."~ 
(Merton thus aroused curiosity about these other so_cial and economic factors, 
but said nothing that systematically addressed their role.) So science can flourish 
in Catholic environments after all. Ascetic Protestantism, Merton said, is a pow- 
erful  motive  force  to  science,  but  not  so powerful  that  its  action  cannot  be 
masked by other factors; Catholicism is a powerful antagonistic force, but not so 
powerful that other factors present in a Catholic culture cannot yield a flourishing 
science. 
And even when we focus just upon the causal role of Puritanism and the utili- 
tarian ethos associated with it, we are obliged to acknowledge the explanatory 
limits  Merton  placed  upon  these  considerations.  How  far, for  example,  are 
seventeenth-century  English  scientific developments  (even as Merton  restric- 
tively defined them) to be accounted for by "extrinsic"  factors? Concluding his 
discussion of  the effects of  military and economic "needs," Merton cautiously 
disavowed any unambiguous claim that these needs sufficiently determined even 
the foci of scientific interest. "The extent of this influence is still problematic. It 
is by  no means certain that much the same distribution  of interests would not 
have occurred, irrespective of  this external pressure. Many of these problems 
likewise flowed directly from the intrinsic developments of science." He argued 
only that "some r81e must be accorded these factors external to science, properly 
so-called." In  1970 Merton further stressed the circumscribed  status of  his ex- 
planatory claims for Puritanism. He was not  saying that  "without  Puritanism, 
there  could  have  been  no  concentrated  development  of  modern  science  in 
seventeenth-century England,"  nor  that  Puritanism was a  "prerequisite to the 
substantial thrust  of  English  science in  that  time."  Other  "ideological  move- 
ments"  (Catholicism?) could have performed  the functions discharged by Puri- 
tanism; "as it happened," it was Puritanism that "provided major (not exclusive) 
support in  that historical time and place. But that does not make it indispens- 
able." In the same preface to the reprinting of Science, Technology and Society 
Merton endorsed "the subdued concluding sentence of this aged but perhaps not 
yet obsolete essay." The 1938 text, we recall, ended with a sentence of typically 
gracious academic modesty: "On the basis of the foregoing study, it may not be 
too much to conclude that the cultural soil of seventeenth century England was 
peculiarly fertile for the growth and spread of ~cience."~ 
Note the domain of  application. The thesis is identified here as a story about 
Merton, Science, Technology, p. 208.  'Merton, "Puritanism,  Pietism,"  pp. 574-575  (emphasis in original); and Merton, Science, Tech- 
nology, p.  136. It is unclear how liberal  references  here to the role  of  various  "factors"  relate to 
Merton's  later denial that he espoused a "doctrine of  'factors' ": Merton, "Preface:  1970," ibid., pp. 
vii-xxxii,  on p, x. 
Merton, Science, Technology, pp. 198; xviii, xxix ("Preface:  1970"); 238 (emphases in original). 597  SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: MERTON THESIS 
seventeenth-century England, indeed, to be precise, about certain specific devel- 
opments of scientific dynamics in England in the seventeenth century after the 
Restoration. It is no simple matter to understand how some historians have con- 
flated such a circumscribed thesis with global claims about the relations between 
science,  society, and religion. Insofar as "extrinsic factors"  do play  a role  in 
Merton's claims, he formally acknowledged the limits thereby placed upon cau- 
sal accounting. Merton approvingly quoted his teacher George Sarton's eclectic 
contention  that  even  mathematical  discoveries were  "conditioned  by  outside 
events of every kind. . . . However, we think that those events were only some 
of the factors among others, factors the power of which might vary and did vary 
from time to time."  What was true of mathematics was, Merton said, also true of 
science. Since "these extrinsic conditioning factors" are variable, it follows "that 
we cannot extend our findings for the seventeenth century without further ado to 
the history of science in general. "7 
Of course, Merton did, both in portions of the 1938 text and in an earlier essay, 
attempt to give his thesis rather greater scope. He endeavored, that is, to consti- 
tute and to instantiate the seventeenth-century English science-and-Puritanism 
thesis as one of  his  celebrated  "theories of  the middle range."* For instance, 
Merton's  1936 essay "Puritanism, Pietism and Science," a version of Chapter VI 
of  Science, Technology and Society, did  suggest some ways  of  establishing  a 
thesis that might apply to later periods and in different countries. Here he sys- 
tematically  mobilized  evidence from  eighteenth- and  nineteenth-century  Ger- 
many to argue that "the impression  made by  this  [Protestant] ethic has lasted 
long after much of its theological basis has been largely disavowed." Indeed, the 
1957 bibliographic postscript to that essay reasserted  and refined the claim for 
persistence, citing 1940s and  1950s studies of U.S. scientists that purported to 
show a disproportionately large representation of Protestants and a correspond- 
ingly small representation of  catholic^.^ 
If the precise nature of Merton's explanandum (the dynamics of science taken 
as a whole in a specific context) has been widely "misunderstood" by historians, 
the status and mode of action of  his explanans has never even been accurately 
stated by his critics in the historical community. If this is indeed a causal hypoth- 
esis relating some religious entity and the dynamics of science, what is that reli- 
gious entity and how does it exert its effects upon social action? Gary Abraham 
has rightly identified important sources of  confusion  among historians on this 
head.1° When Merton alluded to the motive force of a religious entity, he did not 
equate this entity with a church or a specific set of  theological doctrines nor, 
'Merton, Science, Technology, pp.  199-200  (quoting George Sarton, The Study of the History of 
Mathematics  [Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard Univ.  Press,  19361, pp.  15-16);  and Merton,  "Preface: 
1970," p. x, where he warned that his inquiry did not suppose "that the character of the interchanges 
that occurred in this period is much the same in other cultures and other times." 
Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (cit. n.  l), p. 5. See also Merton's  cautious backing 
away from the more "far-reaching questions"  about the cultural causes of ascetic Protestantism that 
characterized his teacher Pitirim Sorokin's work on social and cultural dynamics: Merton, Science, 
Technology, p. 136. 
Merton, "Puritanism,  Pietism" (cit. n. 2), pp. 583, 602, 605; and Merton, Science, Technology, 
pp. 119-136,  where, however, the bases of this "persistence"  are not discussed. 
lo Gary A. Abraham, "Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis: A Boundary Dispute between History 
and Sociology," Isis, 1983, 74:368-387,  on pp. 373-374.  Abraham's article is an excellent diagnosis of 
some of the grounds of blocked understanding between Merton and historians. It should be clear to 
what extent my argument agrees with and diverges from his. 598  STEVEN SHAPIN 
indeed, with formal religious beliefs or the maxims that gave voice to these be- 
liefs."  It is not that Merton was "vague"  about the nature and extent of some- 
thing called  "Puritanism,"  "the Protestant  ethic," or  "ascetic  Protestantism." 
The motive force was in fact exerted by an entity that, so to speak, "lay behind" 
any  cultural expression of  "Puritanism"  as it is usually understood. Although 
Merton persistently referred to and named this motive force, I cannot discover 
that any of his followers or critics have appreciated what it is and how it is said to 
influence social action. 
The entity is most  commonly  designated  as a  "sentiment."  Throughout the 
1938 monograph Merton repeatedly pointed to the role of  "sentiments"  as ulti- 
mate motive forces responsible for social action, in this case for the pursuit and 
active approval of science.12  Thus, among very many examples, Merton said he 
sought to identify "the dominant values and sentiments," "the general climate of 
sentiment and belief [that] invariably influence[s] the development of science"; 
he referred to "the motive power of sentiment" and described the Puritan advo- 
cacy of experimental science as "the inevitable outcome of an emotionally con- 
sistent circle of sentiments and beliefs."13 Strictly speaking, sentiments are not to 
be equated with any particular form of  cultural expression. Instead, sentiments 
are to be regarded as socially patterned psychic structures that lie behind, give 
form to, and animate a more or less coherent body of cultural expressions, such 
as those articulated by the publicists of the "Protestant ethic."  It is therefore the 
sentiments, not the religious or ethical doctrines, to which motive force is prop- 
erly attributed. In outlining his characteristic "Sociological Approach,"  Merton 
said that the sociologist's  task is to uncover "the sentiments crystallized in reli- 
gious values and the cultural orientation which governs their expression." While 
alluding to "the powerful motivations which derived from Puritanism," Merton 
clearly did not ascribe motive force to the expression of religious values but to the 
underlying sentiments: 
We must probe under the surface of theological contentions to the sentiments which 
govern their meaning. The religious component of thought, belief and action becomes 
effective only when it is reinforced by strong sentiments which lend meaning to cer- 
tain forms of conduct. These sentiments find expression in word and deed alike. . . . 
We are concerned with verbal responses, religious exhortations and appeals, in so far 
as they enable us to arrive at the motivating sentiments which give rise to these ideas 
and the behaviors associated with them.I4 
Sentiments, therefore, are the theoretically posited  mental entities that make 
Merton's system go, that lie behind the expression of religious values and exert 
force upon social action. Remarkably, in light of the fundamental importance of 
sentiments in Merton's scheme, he nowhere said what they are or clearly indi- 
cated where they came from in traditions of sociological discourse. In fact, the 
vocabulary of sentiments and the ascription to them of social force was not at all 
l1 Merton, Science, Technology, p.  100. 
IZ Apparently  alternative  or equivalent  locutions  in  Merton's  work  include  "value  attitudes," 
"basic values,"  "dominant ideals," etc.; see, e.g., Merton, "Puritanism, Pietism," pp. 574, 577; and 
Merton, Science,  Technology, p.  79. It is perhaps noteworthy that the language of  "sentiments" is 
absent from Merton's  1936 "Puritanism, Pietism" and is pervasive in his 1938 text. 
l3 Merton, Science, Technology, pp. 80, 111, 115; for other invocations of  "sentiments"  see, e.g., 
pp. 58, 60, 75-76,  79. 
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a commonsensical usage in Merton's work. In the United States in the 1930s, the 
deployment of the language of sentiments in formal sociological theorizing was a 
specific and technical  usage, embedded within a particular and highly  charged 
theoretical  and  ideological  tradition.  Most  usually,  it  indicated  affiliation  to 
the sociological theories of  Vilfredo Pareto (184&1923).'5  Put unconscionably 
briefly, Pareto's system was founded upon an analytical triangle (see Figure I), 
the apexes of which were two observable entities-human  actions (B) and state- 
ments about those actions (Cjand  one hypothetical  entity-the  psychological 
or neurological states (A)that disposed men toward their actions. This last entity 
Statements about action, including constant elements 

("residues")  and variable elements ("derivations") 

C 
Indirect relation 
A  B 

Sentiments  Direct relation  Action 

Figure 1. Pareto's analytic scheme; adapted from Vilfredo Pareto, 
A Treatise on General  Sociology (1916; New York: Dover, 1963), 
Vol. I, p. 88. 
was  what  Pareto called a  sentiment. Sentiments were  integral to the Paretan 
scheme, yet in the strict sense sociologists did not have to analyze the nature of 
sentiments. They were unobservable mental states, and a leading Harvard Pare- 
tan said that "we leave them to the psychologists and affirm that their study is for 
our purposes inconvenient and unnecessary. . . . All we are interested in are . . . 
the things we can directly observe." But in loose usage, sentiments were also 
identified with the Paretan category of  "residues" as opposed to "derivations." 
Residues were conceived as the constant elements, derivations the variable ele- 
ments, in people's statements about their actions. Thus Paretans contended that 
residues (verbal behaviors) might, without undue impropriety, be identified with 
the sentiments (mental states) underlying them.16 
l5 The masterwork is Vilfredo Pareto, A Treatise on General Sociology, 4 vols. bound as 2, trans. 
Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York: Dover, 1963) (orig. publ. in Italian in 1916). 
l6  George C. Homans and Charles P. Curtis, Jr., An Introduction to Pareto: His Sociology  (New 
York: Knopf, 1934), pp. 78-81,  88-89; and Pareto, Treatise, Vol. I, pp. 88-94.  Sentiments are also 
technically invoked in the sociology of Emile Durkheim; see, e.g., Durkheim, Selected Writings, ed. 600  STEVEN SHAPIN 
Pareto's  system of sociology was avidly taken up and propagated by a circle of 
sociologists at Harvard in the 1930s. The instigator of the Harvard  "Pareto cir- 
cle" was the functionalist biologist and sociologist L. J. Henderson, and the sem- 
inar on  Pareto over which Henderson presided  from  1932 included the young 
Robert Merton, as well as George Homans, Talcott Parsons, and the industrial 
sociologist Elton Mayo.  Barbara Heyl has  argued that Paretan  sociology was 
attractive to Harvard intellectuals because it was a grand historical theory that 
seemed to "provide an alternative to the Marxist approach."17 George Homans, 
perhaps  the most  vigorous  publicist  of  Pareto's  views,  said that  he  "took  to 
Pareto" because, "as a Republican Bostonian who had not rejected his compara- 
tively wealthy family, I felt during the thirties that I was under personal attack, 
above all from the Marxists. I was ready to believe Pareto because he provided 
me with a defense." Whether other members of the circle were attracted to Par- 
eto for  similar  political  reasons  is  unclear  and  arguably  irrelevant,  although 
Homans found these considerations highly relevant, as he did the task of acquit- 
ting Pareto from the charge of  being the " 'Karl Marx of Fascism.'  "I8  What is 
evident is that Pareto seemed to provide important resources for constructing an 
all-embracing sociological system that  avoided  what members  of  the Harvard 
circle took to be the intellectual failings of  Marxist orientations. Among these 
perceived failings were the Marxist insistence upon the rationality of human be- 
havior, the oversimplified nature of its causal schemes, and the materialist  ne- 
glect of the role of ideas in social action. 
Members of the circle took up Pareto's ideas to varying extents and put them 
to various uses. For example, Elton Mayo, though never  "a full-fledged Pare- 
tan,"  deployed  a Paretan  vocabulary  of  sentiments to depict as irrational yet 
meaningful  the  behavior  of  workers  in  the  famous  Hawthorne  experiments 
that  provided the foundations of  the discipline of  industrial  sociology.19 And 
Merton's  1938 text  bears  eclectic but  unmistakable  marks  of  leading Paretan 
and trans. Anthony Giddens (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.  Press,  1972), p.  219. However,  while 
Merton wrote a review of Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society in 1934, there is only one oblique 
mention of Durkheim in Science, Technology (p. 60 n. 10). For perceived opposition between Pareto 
and Durkheim see Homans and Curtis, lntroduction to Pareto, pp. 90-92. 
l7 Barbara  S. Heyl,  "The  Harvard  'Pareto  Circle,' " Journal  of the  History  of  the  Behavioral 
Sciences, 1968, 4:316-334,  on p. 317. For Merton's attendance at the Pareto seminar see Robert K. 
Merton, "The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir,"  in The Sociology  of Science in Europe, 
ed. Merton and Jerry Gaston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 3-141,  on p. 120 
n.  32.  For Merton's  familiarity  with  European  sociological  perspectives  generally  see Lewis A. 
Coser, "Merton's  Uses of the European Sociological Tradition,"  in  The Idea  of Social  Structure: 
Papers in Honor of Robert K.  Merton, ed. Coser (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 
85-100.  Coser claims that Durkheim was Merton's "consciously chosen role model" (pp. 88-89) and 
documents Merton's acknowledgment of the influence on his early work of Durkheim, Weber, and 
Georg Simmel (pp. 96-97).  There is no mention of Pareto here. 
l8 For Homans see George Caspar Homans, Sentiments  and Activities: Essays  in Social Science 
(London:  Routledge & Kegan  Paul,  1962), p.  4; for Pareto and fascism  see Homans and Curtis, 
lntroduction to Pareto (cit. n. 16), p. 9: "It is true that the Sociologie Ge'ne'rale  has become for many 
Fascists a treatise on government. . . . But in point of fact Pareto maintained in deed and word his 
independence as a scientist. . . . [Wlhile approving some of the Fascist measures, he openly con- 
demned others, especially any limitation of academic freedom." The relationship between Merton's 
own commitment to liberal democracy and his defense of science is well known; see, e.g., David A. 
Hollinger,  "The  Defense  of  Democracy  and  Robert  K.  Merton's  Formulation  of  the  Scientific 
Ethos," Knowledge and Society, 1983, 4:l-15. 
l9 Timothy  Raison,  ed.,  The Founding  Fathers  of Social  Science  (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1969), pp. 113, 118; and Homans and Curtis, lntroduction to Pareto, p. 241. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: MERTON THESIS  601 
themes.  Thus, a major  concern of  that  text  was to display the importance of 
"nonrational"  and "nonlogical" considerations in social action. Sentiments were 
the nonrational  and unconscious  wellsprings of  the social actions involved  in 
sanctioning and pursuing  science in  seventeenth-century Englande20  And inas- 
much as nonrational dispositions were involved, this would explain why the con- 
sequences of  much social action were, as Merton famously insisted, "unantici- 
pated"-for  example,  why  the  original  Protestant  reformers,  who  were  not 
inspired to sanction science, produced an ethic that ultimately did so, or indeed 
why  secularization was  the unintended  outcome  of  the religiously motivated 
science of the seventeenth century.21 
Moreover, Merton shared the Paretan impulse to build  a social science that 
substituted the circumspect language of  "mutual  dependence"  for the  "vulgar 
Marxist"  language of  "cause and effect." Hitherto, I have spoken loosely of the 
"causal" entities in  Merton's  thesis, yet he used the notion of  cause in a much 
softer sense than is (or was) customary in the social sciences. Critics who fail to 
recognize the highly qualified and eclectic sense in which Merton used  causal 
language are doing him a disservice. Thus, Merton cautioned that even the ap- 
parently  "unavoidable implication . . . that religion was the independent variable 
and  science the dependent variable during this period"  was  "not the least our 
intention." Both Puritanism and science, he said, "were components of a vastly 
complicated system of mutually dependent factors." Having pointed to the moti- 
vating force of  sentiments, Merton was exceedingly careful not to attribute to 
them the sole causal role. Sentiments, it is true, underlie and find expression in 
both  "word  and deed,"  but  sentiments, Merton says, can also be affected by 
these  forms  of  action:  "behavior  in  its  turn  reacts  upon  the  sentiments,  re-
inforcing, moulding, at times altering them so that the whole process is one of 
incessant intera~tion."~~  We are to understand that the causal item that motivates 
social action is also an effect of that action. 
This eclecticism extended to the general form of sociological approach Merton 
brought to the Puritanism-and-science thesis. Indeed, it is more correct to refer 
to the general forms  of  sociological approach, since Merton's  1938 text can- 
vassed two relationships  between  action and ideas that he himself regarded as 
distinct. On the one hand, Merton offered a general social-structural theory that 
analyzed the ways by which institutionalized and not-yet-institutionalized activi- 
ties are legitimated. Given that the dominant sentiments of the historical setting 
were expressed  in religious language, any  new form of  social action,  such as 
experimental natural philosophy, was obliged to justify  itself and to seek legiti- 
macy  by  a public  display  of  its  compatibility with those  sentiments and their 
expression: "New patterns of conducts must be justified if they are to take hold 
and become the foci of  social sentiments."  Hence, we can make  sense of  the 
constant insistence by "Puritan scientists" on the utility of their practices and on 
the manner in  which  science could  contribute to religious exercises.  If  these 
20 Merton, Science, Technology (cit. n. l),  pp. 81-82, 101, 107, 136. Pareto is explicitly referred to 
on pp. 60 n. 10, 91  and n. 30, 106 n. 62, 111 n. 73, 226 and n. 51. 
21 Zbid., pp.  79,  101-110;  Merton,  "Puritanism, Pietism"  (cit.  n. 2),  p. 597; and  Merton,  "The 
Unanticipated  Consequences  of  Purposive  Social  Action," American  Sociological  Review,  1936, 
1:894-904. 
22 Merton,  Science,  Technology, pp. 104-105  (see also p. 63), 56; see also his view that verbal 
expressions such as sermons can reinforce "the dominant sentiments of the day" (p. 60). 602  STEVEN SHAPIN 
justifications prove acceptable, the new activity receives social sanction and be- 
comes a value in its own right. Now scientists do not need to offer any "extrin- 
sic" justifications  for the activities: "Institutionalized  values  are conceived as 
self-evident and require no vindication. "23 
Merton reckoned that this theory of "accommodation"  was correct and impor- 
tant,  but  he  insisted  that it  was  by  itself insufficient to account for the links 
between Puritan sentiments and scientific activity. Such a view suggested, Mer- 
ton  said, that expressions of  Puritan values  by  leading scientists were merely 
rationalizations  or "casuistry"-in  Paretan language,  "derivations"  rather than 
"residues."  Moreover, it invited an improper psychological reading of  the rela- 
tionship, one in which scientists consciously cobbled together socially expedient 
justifications for their activities, which activities were in fact motivated solely by 
"intrinsic"  values. On the contrary, Merton stipulated both that scientists were 
genuinely and powerfully motivated  by  religious sentiments and that they need 
not  be conscious of  these  motivation^.^^  Thus, historians  who have sought to 
invalidate Merton's  thesis by  mobilizing evidence that seventeenth-century sci- 
entists were not,  in  the usual parlance,  consciously  motivated  by  religious or 
utilitarian  considerations have missed the point:  Merton's  views cannot be re- 
futed by  such evidence. Nor have they understood  how Merton is entitled to 
diagnose inaccessible motivational states. Again, the procedure is Paretan. Mer- 
ton claimed Paretan warrant to conclude that constant elements in human speech 
accounting  for  action  (the residues)  reliably  "manifest  deep-rooted, effective 
sentiments."  "Speaking elliptically," Merton said, "these constant elements may 
be held to provide motivations for behavior, whereas the variable elements [the 
derivations] are simply post facto justifications."  The identification of genuine 
motivating states might therefore be achieved through a totting-up procedure that 
assessed  which  justifications  appeared  more  or  less  frequently  and  consis- 
tently. Even so, Merton recognized that "in practice, it is at times exceedingly 
difficult to discriminate between the two [residues and  derivation^]."^^ If Merton 
has been widely misunderstood on this score, part of the reason must arise from 
modern readers' lack of familiarity with Paretan schema, and part from Merton's 
loose Paretan identification between  motivating mental states and the constant 
speech  elements  that  were  treated  as expressions  of  the psychic  states that 
23 Ibid., p. 83. 
24 Ibid., pp  81-82,  91, and n. 30. Cf., however, p. 110, where Merton insisted that the Protestant 
ethic represented "the consciously felt motivation of many eminent seventeenth century scientists." 
See also Abraham, "Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis" (cit. n. lo), pp. 371-372,  which claims to 
identify "ambiguity"  in Merton's motivational analysis. Merton characterized this psychological ac- 
count as "independent"  of his "justification"  hypothesis: Science, Technology, p. 81. I  must confess 
to an attempt at constructive simplification in my brief sketch of "The Merton Thesis" in The Dictio- 
nary of the History of Science, ed. W.  F. Bynum, E. J. Browne, and Roy Porter (London: Macmil- 
Ian,  1981), p. 262. Given limited  space, I elected to stress the social-structural aspect of Merton's 
thesis, neglecting the psychological dimensions. Apart from purely pragmatic excuses, I could argue 
that the elements I emphasized are precisely those less known among historians. 
25 Merton, Science, Technology, p. 91 and n. 30; and Merton, "Puritanism, Pietism" (cit. n. 2), pp. 
603-604.  Of course, Merton did not approach this aspect of his thesis statistically; constant elements 
in  Puritan  expressions were identified  impressionistically. In the  "Postscript"  to the  "Puritanism, 
Pietism"  essay Merton offered a further definitive test of whether Puritan values were motives as 
opposed to rationalizations:  such a test is  "to be found in  the behavior which  accords with these 
reasons, even when there is little or no prospect of self-interested mundane reward"  (p. 604). Robert 
Boyle's behavior was pointed to as such proof; but cf. James R. Jacob, Robert Boyle and the English 
Revolution: A Study in Social and Intellectual Change (New York: Burt Franklin,  1977). SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: MERTON THESIS  603 
caused them, as a cause of the states, and as the means of discerning the states. 
Merton's  Paretan language of  "mutual dependence" and incessant reciprocal 
interaction  between  mental  states  and  verbal  and  nonverbal  behaviors  cuts 
across the more familiar sociological vocabulary associated with coherent "ideal- 
ist" and "materialist"  frameworks. Merton himself insisted in 1938, and again in 
1970, that his orientation was neither the one nor the other. In Science, Technol- 
ogy and Society Merton obliquely engaged with the materialist view that ideas 
could not properly be treated as causative agents in social action. His eclectically 
Paretan solution was to preserve elements of what was usually taken to be mate- 
rialism and to mix them with elements of what was usually taken to be idealism. 
Thus, Merton said: 
It is also an acceptable hypothesis that ideologies seldom give rise to action and that 
both the ideology and the action are rather the product of  common sentiments and 
values which motivate conduct. But these ideas cannot be ignored for two reasons. 
They provide clues for detecting the basic values which motivate conduct. Such sign 
posts cannot be profitably neglected. Of even greater importance is the r61e of ideas 
in directing action into particular channels. It is the dominating system of ideas which 
determines the choice between alternative modes of action which are equally compat- 
ible with the underlying sentiments. Without such guidance and direction, non-logical 
action would become, within the limits of the value-system, random.26 
In 1970 Merton applauded his youthful skill in steering his interpretative boat 
between  the Scylla and Charybdis of materialism and idealism, though without 
explaining the eclectically Paretan foundations of that judiciousness.  "As every- 
one knows,"  Merton ironically commented, " 'idealistic'  and  'materialistic'  in- 
terpretations are forever alien to one another, condemned to ceaseless contradic- 
tion and intellectual warfare. Still, what everyone should know from the history 
of  thought often turns out not to be so at all." Merton condemned "the mock 
choice between a vulgar Marxism and an equally vulgar purism."27 
Indeed, there is a widely diffused, and a well-supported, view that idealism and 
materialism are rightly set in opposition, and that one cannot mix elements of the 
one with  the  other as the occasion  or  eclectic impulses  seem to require.  If 
present-day readers treat Merton's text as belonging to one or the other of these 
traditions, they are in no different position than some of those closer to Merton 
and the circumstances out of which his work arose. His own sociology teacher at 
Harvard, Pitirim Sorokin, continually insisted that Merton "succumbed to M[ax] 
Weber's theory, overlooking its weak points," and that "he gives a vast body of 
empirical facts, but applies for their interpretation an uncritically accepted, inad- 
equate theory of Max Weber."28 Sorokin pointed to what he took to be the causal 
ambiguity and teleological character of Merton's functional e~planations.~~ 
26 Merton, Science, Technology, p.  91 (emphases in original);  see also Merton, "Puritanism,  Pie- 
tism," p. 604. 
27 Merton, "Preface:  1970" (cit. n. 5), pp. xix, xiii.  "Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality:  Their Structure and Dynamics: A System 
of General Sociology  (New York: Harper,  1947), p.  657n; and Sorokin, Sociological  Theories  of 
Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p.  456n. Sorokin rejected  both materialist Marxism and 
idealist Weberianism as untenable theories of cultural change. 
29  Sorokin, Sociological  Theories, pp. 447,450: "Aparticularly conspicuous trait of Merton's theo- 
ries is their ambivalence" (ibid., p. 447 n. 7). For Merton's part, he accused his former teacher of the 
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The more closely one reads Merton's  1938 text, the more astonishing it is that 
this work has elicited such vigorous and at times intemperate opposition. As I 
have noted above, Merton phrases his argument in extremely cautious and pru- 
dent terms. Of  course, the language of Pareto's  sociology is now little known in 
the academic world, and Merton's disinclination to explain and to expand upon 
certain Paretan notions  has not made it easy for modern readers to grasp the 
basic elements of his sociological approach. For all that, failure to appreciate its 
methodological eclecticism and judiciousness  can at best be the result of the very 
"swift-reading"  at which Merton mildly bridled in  1970.30  However, there is a 
price to be paid for eclecticism and judiciousness. If  one tries too hard to avoid 
being  clearly  wrong,  one may  well  be  perceived  as not  clear  at  all.  "Swift- 
reading"  may be culpable in the academic world, but it is all too common, the 
more so if  one's readers have their  "straw men"  already formed in their minds 
before they come to the text. 
The list  of  caveats, cautions,  and qualifications that  have to be  taken  into 
account if one wishes to understand the Merton thesis properly is, as I have tried 
to show, dauntingly large. It is not a materialist thesis, and not an idealist the- 
sis; it  is  partly  psychological,  and partly  social-structural; it  is  particular  to 
seventeenth-century England, but  not wholly  so; it  concerns the dynamics of 
scientific enterprises, but not their intellectual content or methods; it identifies 
causes of social action that are also the effects of action. An apparently paradox- 
ical conclusion suggests itself. The reason historians are still so animated about 
the Merton thesis fifty years on is precisely because it has been so widely mis- 
represented. 
Less glibly, one might say that the legacy of this thesis has been both triumph 
and failure. Given the curmudgeonly disposition of the scholarly world, victory is 
always less visible than defeat. Yet no historian  of  science now seriously con- 
tends that religious forces were wholly, or even mainly, antagonistic to natural 
science. When Merton wrote his thesis, that was not the case, and we owe a debt 
to him (as well as to other historians of the 1930s) for establishing the nature of 
some positive links between science and religion and for setting up an empirical 
program  of  research  dedicated  to exploring them.  Similarly, no historian  now 
seriously  maintains  that the thematics and  dynamics  of  scientific activity (its 
"foci of interest") are unaffected by social and economic  consideration^.^' When 
Merton wrote his thesis, this was not a common point of view, especially outside 
Marxist circles. If historians of science have been reluctant to give Merton full 
credit for these contributions, it is perhaps because the focus of  the discipline 
(intellectualist and contextualist, rationalist and sociological) has continued to be 
upon  the very  knowledge  and methods that  Merton  surrounded with  a black 
b0x.3~ 
and Bernard Barber, "Sorokin's Formulations in the Sociology of Science," in Pitirim A. Sorokin in 
Review, ed. Philip J. Allen (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 332-368,  esp. pp. 334, 343, 
357-361.  (Sorokin did not have a high opinion of Pareto's work.) 
30 Merton, "Preface:  1970" (cit. n. 5), p. xviii.  " For one of the very few historical attempts to apply and develop Merton's approach to "foci of 
interest" constructively see Steven Shapin, "The Audience for Science in Eighteenth Century Edin- 
burgh," History of Science, 1974, 12:95-121, esp. pp. 104-110. 
32 Almost needless to say, present-day  historians would not be as comfortable as Merton was in 
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There is still, however, important historical work to be done in and around the 
Merton  thesis.  There is  something  about  it  and  the general  orientation  from 
which it emerged that should not be allowed to disappear from our view. In 1970 
Merton identified "a principal assumption underlying the entire book. The sub- 
stantial and persistent development of science occurs only in societies of a cer- 
tain kind, which provide both cultural and material conditions for that develop- 
ment."33 The problematic from which Merton's work emerged in the 1930s was 
one that accepted the interest, importance, and legitimacy of macrosociological 
theorizing about the historical development and social setting of  culture. How, 
after all, did we come to inhabit the world of modern science? What, after all, are 
the relations between large-scale social change and large-scale cultural change? 
The footnotes of  Merton's  text are littered  with  the corpses  of  big  men  who 
ventured big  thoughts,  scholars of  erudition  who were not  afraid of  grappling 
with  such problems, and who belonged to an academic culture in which they 
were  expected  to  do so:  Hessen,  Pareto,  Sorokin,  Weber,  Franz  Borkenau, 
R. H. Tawney, Ernst Troeltsh. Where are their like now? Where in the academic 
history of science are their concerns being addressed? The price of professional- 
ism in the history of science has been a certain timidity, even a certain triviality. 
If  we  want  to recover  our  scholarly nerve,  we  could do much  worse than to 
explore the resources  and orientations, the "foci of  interest," of the scholarly 
world that precipitated the Merton thesis. 
discern many versions of science in that setting; on the other, they question whether any version of 
seventeenth-century science can simply be equated with modem beliefs and practices.  "Merton, "Preface: 1970" (cit. n. 5), p. xix. 